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1. Introduction 
What is the relation between the I and the we in social interactions? As a famous saying goes, ‘there is no 
I in team’. Successful football players, for instance, are those that know how to cooperate and to act in a 
way that is beneficial to their team. Similarly, in everyday life, we often coordinate our behaviour without 
any problems. For example, when we enter a bus while someone else must leave, we usually manage the 
space smoothly.
Cases of coordination and cooperation, like the ones mentioned above, pose explanatory challenges. 
Given that it is always individuals who make the decisions in these cases, how can the abovementioned 
examples be explained? Cooperation problems demand that one forgoes individual incentives to defect 
in order for a group goal to materialise. We can imagine the football player mentioned above to be in 
a situation where he can try to score or to pass the ball on to another player who then might score. He 
knows that chances for his team to score are much higher if he cooperates. Yet, individually, the player 
has an incentive to deviate. For him, individually, the expected outcome is much higher if he tries to 
score. This is because if he makes the goal, he will get all the recognition. In case of failure, however, 
the player might still be able to blame bad luck. In situations like this, how can we explain cooperative 
behaviour, which we arguably still observe (Sugden, 2000)?
Similarly, coordination problems invoke some explanatory challenges. Even if there are no individual 
incentives to deviate from coordination, different ways to reach the same outcome might still exist. 
Imagine, for instance, when you have to enter a bus while another person needs to leave. Which side 
of the door should you occupy? Should you wait or just enter? For a smooth entrance, it is crucial that 
both of you react in the same way. For example, you take the right-hand side of the door, while the other 
person takes the left-hand side. But it is equally permissible that you choose the left-hand side and the 
other person the right-hand side. Note that there is nothing inherent in the decision situation which tells 
an individual what to do (Grüne-Yanoff and Lehtinen, 2010). Yet, our everyday experience shows that 
we manage to solve these problems without particular difficulties and without talking to one another.
In this paper, I shall address one specific account which tries to offer a solution to these types of 
problems: Sugden’s (2000) theory of ‘team reasoning’. Sugden proposes to think of coordination and 
cooperation problems as challenges that a group of people must solve together. Therefore, a person does 
not think about what she should do individually, constrained by how the other agents might act. But a 
person considers what she can do together with others, as a group. For a group to exist, all agents must 
acknowledge is that they must solve a problem together with others and they have to believe that the 
other agents engage in this perspective too. If this is in place, Sugden’s team reasoning straightforwardly 
solves cooperation and coordination problems because agents can act on a group perspective.
Sugden (2000) calls thinking in terms of the group perspective ‘team-directed reasoning’. The term 
‘directed’ in team-directed reasoning hints at the special perspective Sugden takes. For Sugden, it is 
always individuals who engage in reasoning. Team-directed reasoning identifies what is best for the 
group, all things considered. This can also be called the group- or team goal. Team-directed reasoning 
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thus suggests the strategy that achieves the team goal. For example, in a football game, the goal is to win 
the match. So, everyone acting in line with the group goal should choose the strategy that maximises the 
team’s chances to win. To achieve this, Sugden maintains that team-directed reasoning is a psychological 
process that individuals engage in for themselves. Furthermore, it can be maintained that team-directed 
reasoning is a methodologically individualistic account because it is reducible to individuals engaging in 
that perspective. Hence, an agent’s decision to take the group perspective does not depend on what the 
other agents do. This allows to represent team-directed reasoning by rational choice language34. Team 
preferences are the preferences an agent identifies by engaging in team-directed reasoning. 
I shall argue that (a), Sugden’s (2000) theory of team reasoning does not sufficiently account for 
individual, self-interested temptations that potentially undermine an agent’s ability to act on team 
preferences. I will give an example of cooperation where all of Sugden’s conditions are fulfilled. That is, 
agents engage in team-directed reasoning and take themselves to be members of a team. I will show that 
in such a situation it is still perfectly legitimate for an agent to act on their self-interest. (b) based on (a), 
I propose that Sugden’s theory of team-directed reasoning should be interpreted as an agent recognising 
what, all things considered, would be best for the group. However, I will also point out that this mode 
of thinking is not exclusive. I will show that it is legitimate to assume that an agent has access to both 
their individual- and their group preferences in a decision situation. Based on this characterisation, I will 
argue that Sugden’s theory does not solve cooperation- and coordination problems. This is because if 
it is acceptable that agents engage in both team-directed reasoning and individual reasoning, and that 
the presence of a team in itself does not give reason to act according to the team goal, it is not clear why 
following team preferences should solve coordination- and cooperation problems. The point that I will 
exploit is that there is a difference between engaging in team-directed reasoning and acting accordingly. 
To act in line with the team goal, I will argue, it is necessary that every member can trust in the other 
agents acting according to team-directed reasoning. But since that is not given, I conclude that team-
directed reasoning does not offer a solution to coordination and cooperation problems. 
I shall proceed as follows: In Section (1) I present a problem of coordination and how Sugden’s 
theory of team-directed reasoning would address it. I continue by arguing in favour of claim (a) in 
Section 2. That is, I will argue that Sugden does not sufficiently address the conflict between individual 
and group interests. Section 3 defends claim (b) and argues that team-directed reasoning does not solve 
coordination- and cooperation problems. Section 4 concludes.
34 The tools of rational choice theory are preferences. Preferences are tuples comparisons of alternative states of the world. 
If these tuples fulfil the conditions of transitivity and completeness (that is, they include everything that matters for an agent 
in a particular state of the world), they can be represented numerically as a function. This function is called utility function 
(Savage, 1971; Bradley, 2014). In the following I will also use the word payoff function to describe the same concept. A second, 
important point is that rational choice theory can be seen as an idealisation of reasoning (Risjord, 2014, 106– 107). Therefore, 
whenever I use the terms preferences, or reasoning/ thinking interchangeably, I refer to the concept of idealisation. This 
holds for both team-directed reasoning and team preferences as well as individual reasoning and individual preferences.
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2. Coordination and Sugden’s theory of team-directed reasoning
In this section, I present Sugden’s (2000) theory of team reasoning. I begin with a coordination problem 
and then explain how Sugden’s theory would solve the problem by employing team-directed reasoning.
At my university, every morning, many students need to go to class. The best way to reach the 
classrooms is via an escalator which directly goes to the third floor. Some of the students are in a hurry 
to arrive on time and need to move fast. I denote them as players of type-f (). Other students have more 
time and walk slowly. These students are identified as players of type-s (). Students of both types need to 
coordinate the space on the escalators. Unfortunately, talking to one another is not an option since all 
students are listening to music on their headphones35. Therefore, the challenge that the students face is 
to interact with one another and to respond in the best possible way to players of the other type. Consider 
now Figure 136. For simplicity, all players are summarised under their types, that is, (pf) and (ps).
If both and do not coordinate, that is, use the same or both sides of the escalator at the same time, they 
end up with utility 0. Note that the exact number of utilities an agent gets if coordination fails does 
not matter here. What is important is that both players are considerably worse off compared to both 
coordinative equilibria. In the case of those students who are in a hurry, it is straightforward why they 
have a low utility if coordination fails: they will miss their class. But those students who have more 
time will be worse off as well. It arguably bothers one if other people constantly want to pass by and 
complain. Therefore, it would be best for both to coordinate. Hence, players of type-s would need to pick 
one side of the escalator and players of type-f the other side. In principle, which side is used by which 
players does not matter. However, we can imagine that the agents are used to walk on the right-hand side 
and to surpass someone on their left-hand side. Assuming that agents have a preference to coordinate 
according to this convention rather than the opposite way, it can be stated that if use the left-hand side 
and if use the right-hand side of the escalator, they achieve the best possible outcome to this problem.
35 Unlike this case, in many coordination games it is not possible for players to communicate, but they still have to coordinate. 
Therefore, referring to language is not a general solution.
36 Standard games can be represented in this form: The rows represent the strategies of while the columns represent the 
strategies of . Moreover, the first number in the matrix represents the payoff of the first player, while the second number the 
payoff of the second player (Grüne-Yanoff and Lehtinen, 2010).
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However, analysing the above situation from a game-theoretic perspective, this game has no unique 
solution. As Sugden (2000) points out, payoff dominance – that is, choosing the strategy that leads to 
the overall best outcome in terms of payoffs – gives strategic players no apparent reason to choose a 
particular strategy. This is because rational players choose their strategy taking into consideration their 
expected outcome37 conditional on what they think the other player will choose. Thus, both and will 
choose [left] when they expect the other player to choose [right] and vice versa. Since no player knows 
what the other player will choose, their thinking will be a regress. Thus, there is no unique solution to 
this coordination problem.
This particular result seems counterintuitive. In fact, at my university I can observe students that 
coordinate on the optimal equilibrium. Similarly, our experience of everyday life tells us that we can 
solve these problems without any particular difficulties. Sugden’s (2000, 183) account of team-directed 
reasoning builds on this tension between our experience and what strategic game theory would suggest 
and proposes a solution. Sugden suggests changing the perspective. He argues that instead of asking 
‘What should I do?’, the question ‘What should we do?’ offers a way out. In other words, Sugden suggests 
conceiving of these problems differently. Agents should not be seen as acting in accordance with their 
individual utility functions, but rather as being able to take the group perspective into account. That way, 
rational agents can overcome coordination failures and choose what is best for the team.
From a conceptual perspective, it works exactly the same way, whether agents engage in team-directed 
reasoning or in individual self-interested reasoning38. The difference is what the players choose to care 
about. In team-directed reasoning, it is the team’s utility function, and in individual reasoning, it is their 
individual utility function. Thus, team-directed reasoning can formally be characterised as a preference 
order that is in line with the group goal. Hence, team-directed reasoning with respect to some game of 
form G generates team preferences which can be represented by a utility function t(.) (Sugden, 2000).
It is important to see that Sugden (2000) characterises team-directed reasoning as not being 
conditional on what other members of the team think. Team-directed reasoning is an individual account 
of reasoning directed towards the goal of the group. And the goal of the group is simply taken from 
the problem setup. To see how team-directed reasoning is able to solve coordination problems, consider 
Figure 2. Let me assume for a moment that this is a situation where team-directed reasoning applies. In 
the following, I will explain why this example can be represented as such.
37 The outcome as characterized by preferences, conditional on what the other player chooses.
38 To clarify, individual preferences might be other regarding as well. It is perfectly fine for an individual, in their ‘self-
interested’ preferences to care about other people. The difference between individual and group preferences is that the group 
preferences are identified by thinking about specific coordination and cooperation problems which a ‘purely’ individualistic 
perspective is not able to overcome (Sugden, 2000).
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Figure 2 represents coordination on an escalator according to Sugden’s (2000) account of team-directed 
reasoning. The difference compared to Figure 1 is that an agent who applies team-directed reasoning 
considers the group outcomes rather than their individual preferences. Thus, the strategic element of 
game theory, where all agents choose their strategy under consideration of how the other agents might 
act, is not present anymore: An agent who employs team-directed reasoning can straightforwardly choose 
according to team preferences t(.). Hence, all players employing team-directed reasoning and belonging 
to type-f will take the left-hand side of the escalator, players belonging to type-s will act respectively. 
Consequently, team-directed reasoning induces coordination on [left, right].
To guarantee that agents employ this type of thinking, they have to take themselves as members of a 
team. Sugden (2000, 195) argues that for this to be in place, team confidence is needed. Team confidence 
is the confidence of an individual agent in a system of first and higher-order beliefs. That is beliefs that 
the other members engage in team-directed reasoning too. Further, beliefs that the other members 
believe, that the individual themselves follows team-directed reasoning. In the following, my argument 
will employ that there might be a difference between team-directed reasoning and Sugden’s conditions 
being in place and acting upon it. I will highlight that Sugden never rules out individual interests and 
temptations completely and that this poses a challenge to his account.
Confidence in these beliefs is an empirical concept (Sugden, 2000, 196). This means confidence is 
based on an agent’s observations about how other agents behave. If one sees that other agents coordinate 
in accordance with team-directed reasoning, this suffices to induce confidence in the team’s existence. 
But this does not rule out stronger forms of confidence. Mutual agreement, for instance, would be such 
a stronger form of team confidence.
Finally, for a team to exist, all members of the team (with ) have to engage in team-directed reasoning 
and have to take themselves to be members of a team as well. If these two conditions are fulfilled, team 
agency is in place (Sugden, 2000). 
Concerning the escalator example, these points clarify why team reasoning applies. Sugden (2000) 
never states that a group identity is necessary, that agents need to know one another, or that someone 
ought to act according to team preferences. For team agency to be in place, it suffices that everyone, 
individually, observes coordination in line with team-directed reasoning. Moreover, every agent is aware 
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To conclude this section, it is worth to pause for a moment and appreciate what Sugden (2000) 
has achieved. Sugden suggested to think of coordination problems, like the one on the escalator, as 
challenges that a group of people has to overcome together. This reframing of decision problems solves 
a challenge to game theory. Game theory is not able to explain how we, in our everyday lives, manage to 
coordinate. Because, by simply maximising one’s own utility function under consideration of what other 
agents might do, many interactions do not have straightforward solutions. By assuming team-directed 
reasoning, however, a theoretical answer is given to these problems39.
In the next section, I will point out that Sugden (2000) might be too confident in his account. In fact, 
I will show that there are legitimate cases where self-interest overrides team preferences even though 
Sugden’s conditions of team agency are in place.
3. The challenge from self-interest 
Let me now continue with an example which fulfils all of Sugden’s (2000) conditions of team agency 
where, however, behaviour in accordance with the team’s goal is not given. Based on this example I will 
then move on to argue in favour of claim (a), namely that team reasoning as it is understood by Sugden 
is not able to accommodate the conflict between individual and group interests.
Consider again the case where students must coordinate on escalators. Given Sugden’s (2000) 
conditions it can easily be explained why this is a case where team agency is in place. As highlighted 
above, all agents face a coordination problem about the space on the escalator and this coordination 
problem cannot be solved by strategic thinking. But there is a solution which is easily visible for everyone. 
Namely, for all players {, if you are a player of type-f, choose [left] and if you are a player of type-s, your 
strategy is [right]. Confidence in this type of coordination is given because every agent observes that the 
other players are acting accordingly. Thus, team agency is in place. To make this step clearer, consider 
that every agent faces a choice between [left] and [right]. Note that this is a situation where the agent must 
interact with other players. By observing others, the system of first and higher-order beliefs emerges. 
Every player believes that the other players engage in team-directed reasoning too. Thus, coordination 
should take place in accordance with team preferences.
This is the general setup. But now consider one of the students, Ann, in detail. Let me assume 
that Ann is aware of the common goal of all {, on the escalator to facilitate movement. Furthermore, 
by engaging in team-directed reasoning, Ann identifies [left, right] as a solution to the coordination 
problem. Also, Ann knows that she must coordinate. Therefore, she takes herself to be a member of {, 
. That is, she confidently believes that all other players engage in team-directed reasoning and that they 
expect her to do so too. Therefore, Ann behaves according to team-directed reasoning, at least most of 
the time. Sometimes Ann uses the escalator while chatting with John. In such cases, Ann, even though 
a player of type-s, prefers to stand next to John on the left-hand side of the escalator. Note, Ann is aware 
of the team goal in that case too. But that does not stop her from standing next to John. This is because 
Ann values her self-interest at that moment more than acting on team preferences. Note that regarding 
39 With regards to cooperation problems, Sugden (2000) claims that his account works analogously. Team-directed reasoning 
not only identifies solutions for coordination problems, but also for cooperation problems.
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Sugden’s conditions of team agency nothing changes: Ann still engages in team-directed reasoning and 
is confident that she is part of the group {, . Nevertheless, Ann chooses to stand on the left-hand side 
of the escalator. That is, Ann chooses to put her individual self-interest above the group preferences.
In other words, there is a difference between engaging in team-directed reasoning and acting according 
to it. This example highlights that Ann recognises both, the team’s preferences and her individual 
interests. To clarify, the case where Ann talks to John is not the same as standard coordination on the 
escalator. This example transformed the payoffs of individual agents so that it became a cooperation 
problem. But, as emphasised, Sugden (2000) claims that his account is able to solve both types of 
problems. Therefore, in terms of intuitive plausibility, nothing should be objected. Ann engages in a 
situation which fulfils all of Sugden’s conditions, but acts on her self-interest. The challenge with team 
agency lies in the fact that it does not necessarily give an agent reasons to act in accordance with it.
Sugden (2000) might respond to this critique by arguing that it genuinely misconceives the nature of 
team-directed reasoning. Sugden (2000, 182– 183) writes:
The idea is that, in relation to a specific decision problem, an individual may conceive of herself 
as a member of a group or team, and conceive of the decision problem, not as a problem for her 
but as a problem for the team […] For someone who has framed a decision problem in this way, 
relevant advice about what to do has to be addressed, not to the individual alone, or even to each 
member of the team independently, but to each member of the team as a member of the team.
In other words, Sugden’s (2000) theory builds on the idea that team-directed reasoning is about 
solving problems together. Therefore, is the idea that individual self-interest can play a role simply 
incommensurable. Consequently, individual preferences or strategic considerations do not play a role in 
team-directed reasoning, they are something different.
From the methodological perspective, this interpretation of Sugden’s (2000) account implies that if 
an agent engages in team-directed reasoning and takes herself to be a member of a team, that agent only 
considers the team’s utility function t(.) and not individual preferences. Thus, an agent will act according 
to t(.) in virtue of being a member of a team. 
I consider this interpretation of team agency to be implausible. Being able to identify what we should 
do as a group, as distinct from what I should do individually, does not mean that the latter is ignored. 
An important reason for this is that group confidence is an empirical concept. Simply observing that 
other agents act in accordance with a group goal is unlikely to induce confidence in team agency which is 
strong enough to ignore self-interest (Hindriks, 2012). But in some cases, team agency might be stronger 
than being based on empirical observation. Soldiers, for instance, are trained to commit to their orders 
and their company even under risk of their life. But soldiers are trained to do so and know that they can 
trust their companions. Yet, even the military knows soldiers who desert. Arguably, many of them are 
afraid for their lives when they decide to disregard orders and not to act on the team goal.
My point here is not to argue that it is impossible that agents will act on team preferences rather 
than their individual ones. What I aim to show here is that it is plausible to assume that even if team 
agency is in place, individual interests might come first, which means that agents act on their individual 
preferences, rather than on the team preferences.
This point can be stated more strongly. It is not clear why someone who chooses to engage in team-
directed reasoning should ignore their self-interest completely. Being able to identify what we should do 
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as a group, as distinct from what I should do individually, and choosing that the we perspectives matters 
does not mean that individual considerations will be ignored. Since Sugden (2000) takes his theory to be 
broadly applicable, I contend that it is legitimate to maintain that agents might sometimes act on team 
preferences and sometimes not. Note that I am not making any claims about how an agent chooses 
between individual or group interests. I believe that this is a crucial question too because it is not clear 
from a rational choice perspective which goal should be taken as prior. My argument is that Sugden 
simply ignores the possibility of self-interested motivations in cases of team-directed reasoning. And 
this, I argue, poses a challenge for his account to solve coordination and cooperation problems.
Let me restate my argument so far. Sugden’s (2000) theory of team reasoning fails to account for 
Ann’s decision not to coordinate in line with the group goal. The problem is that Sugden does not 
sufficiently accommodate for challenges between individual and group interests. In the next section, I 
will defend claim (b). Claim (b) states that it is important to account for this conflict between individual 
and group interests in situations where team-directed reasoning applies. But if this conflict is accounted 
for, Sugden’s theory of team reasoning fails to offer a solution to coordination problems.
4. An alternative interpretation of team-directed reasoning
As emphasised above, agents acting in situations which are characterised as cooperation problems can 
face a decision between their self-interest and the interest of their group. In this section, I will do 
two things. First, I will show that it is acceptable to interpret Sugden’s (2000) account in a way which 
accommodates this tension. I propose to think of an agent in decision situations where team-directed 
reasoning applies, as having access to both the group as well as their individual preferences. Second, 
accepting this interpretation of Sugden’s theory of team reasoning, I will point out that team-directed 
reasoning does not offer a solution to coordination and cooperation problems anymore.
Team-directed reasoning can be understood as an individual recognising what, all things considered, 
would be best for the group, distinct from the question of what would be best for oneself. With this, I 
mean that both individual- and team-directed reasoning can exist in the same coordination problem and 
that it is legitimate to assume that an individual is aware of both. Thus, the question an agent must face 
is upon which preferences they should act.
Sugden characterises team-directed reasoning as a mode of thinking which recognises what, all 
things considered, one should do when acting as a member of a team. Sugden (2000, 195) writes:
My analysis prescribes what he [an agent] should rationally choose if he takes himself to be acting 
as a member of the team - that is, if he engages in team-directed reasoning.
But note that Sugden (2000) never rules out that an agent cannot consider their self-interest too. 
In fact, by characterising team-directed reasoning as a mode of reasoning and team agency by a series 
of conditions – which boils down to understanding what the group goal is as well as observing other 
agents engage in behaviour in accordance with the group preferences – Sugden does not rule out that 
individuals can also think what they, individually, prefer and what is best for themselves.
 Maintaining that individuals can engage in both team-directed reasoning as well as self-interested 
considerations does not rule out that coordination can happen in line with the group goals. Though, 
what follows from this claim is that every agent must choose whether they want to act on their team 
preferences or their individual ones. Consider, for example, what it means to live together in a household. 
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Be it as a family or a shared flat, keeping the common spaces clean is a collective endeavour which, 
arguably, everyone agrees upon. But this does not rule out that, when it comes to one individual to clean, 
a person has a series of incentives to clean only superficially or even not at all. I think this example nicely 
points at the inherent tension between individual and group interests. This tension does not have to be 
based on a conscious reasoning process. What I take it to be is a primitive notion of an agent recognising 
what is best for oneself, as opposed to what is best for the team. Now, how an agent chooses in an actual 
situation is a different question and to answer it would require detailed accounts of cognitive decision 
making. But for me, to make my point, this is not necessary. I simply maintain that agents are, generally 
speaking, aware of this tension between individual and group interests. Agents are aware of this tension 
not only for themselves, but they also know that other agents face similar conflicts.
 Interpreting team-directed reasoning as a mode of thinking that exists alongside self-interested 
considerations seems the plausible working hypothesis for rational agents. However, I will show that this 
interpretation ultimately undermines what team-directed reasoning tries to establish in the first place: A 
solution to coordination problems.
 To see why, consider once again coordination at the escalator. This time we need to look at Carol who 
approaches the escalator in a hurry. Carol sees Ann and John in front of her approaching the escalator 
too. By engaging in team-directed reasoning Carol knows that for all {, the following strategy-set applies: 
If you are a , choose [left], if you are a , choose [right]. This would be the optimal solution, which is also 
followed by other players, as Carol observes. All {, on the escalator act in line with team preferences. 
Carol is also confident that Ann and John individually coordinate in line with team-directed reasoning. 
So far, Carol saw them every week taking the same escalator. However, in these cases, Carol observed 
Ann and John only individually, instead of walking together. Thus, based on Sugden’s condition, Carol 
can assume that team agency is in place. But should Carol act on the team preferences? Carol knows 
based on team-directed reasoning what she should do, but she is also aware that individuals can act 
on their self-interest. Thus, observing Ann chatting with John in front of her causes Carol to seriously 
doubt whether Ann and John will follow the team preferences. Therefore, Carol identifies two possible 
strategies: She can either try to coordinate on team-preferences. In that case, Carol would take the left-
hand side of the escalator and hope that the space in front of her is empty so that she can easily walk 
on the escalator. Or, Carol could also try to push forward on the right-hand side of the line to get to 
the escalator before Ann and John arrive. Carol must choose her strategy depending on what she thinks 
that Ann will do. If Ann acts on her self-interest and stands next to John on the escalator, Carol should 
defect too to be on time for class. However, if Ann would coordinate on team preferences, for Carol that 
would be the best choice as well. 
 Clearly, this is a case of strategic interaction as game theory models it. Team-directed reasoning 
interpreted as a mode of reasoning which exists alongside individual, self-interested reasoning does 
not offer a solution anymore. Note that what this example establishes is not that Ann’s choice between 
individual or group interests in itself undermines the possibility of coordination and cooperation. It is the 
possibility that Ann can act on either mode which challenges Sugden’s theory of team reasoning. Carol, 
who simply wants to coordinate, must take this point into consideration and her confidence in the team 
is undermined. Generally speaking, the problem is that confidence in other agents engaging in team-
directed reasoning does by no means imply confidence that other agents act accordingly. But to trust in 
team-preferences, confidence that other agents act according to team-directed reasoning is necessary. 
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I presented Sugden’s theory of team reasoning. I argued that (A), Sugden’s theory is not 
able to sufficiently account for challenges between individual self-interest and team goals. The point I 
made is that there is a difference between saying that individuals engage in team-directed reasoning and 
have to solve a coordination or cooperation problem together, and claiming that, because of engaging 
in team-directed reasoning, self-interest will be ignored. (B) Exploiting this argument, I proposed 
to think of team-directed reasoning as an agent being aware of the group goal, but that this way of 
thinking does not lead one to ignore their self-interest. However, I showed that on this account, team-
directed reasoning does not solve coordination problems anymore. Hence, I conclude that team-directed 
reasoning does not offer a solution to coordination and cooperation problems.
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